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MISCELLANEOUS
Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There. 1871

1

11. INTRODUCTION
"The time has come," the Walrus said,
"To talk of many things:
Of shoes--and ships-and sealing-waxOf cabbages--and kingsAnd why the sea is boiling hotAnd whether pigs have wings."

And whether Courts can force a lass
to suffer five more years:
And pay ten thousand oysters more
and cry that many tears
Because the Court can find no facts
to base a guilty plea When state, defense and jurors twelve
all say to it, "There be!"
Italicized portion from "The Walrus and The Carpenter," by Lewis Carroll (from Through the
Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There, 1871). Illustration by John Tenniel.

The State asks the Court to fall through the looking glass by adopting the perplexing
proposition that the District Court should not have accepted the proffered guilty plea for lack of a
factual basis even though the state's prosecutor, the defendant, defense counsel and, eventually,
twelve jurors all believed there was such a basis. The District Court's wrongful refi~salto accept
Ms. Schoger's plea to the lesser charge resulted in her being convicted of a more serious offense,
sentenced to a longer term of imprisonment and be burdened with a greater fine than what would
have occurred pursuant to the plea agreement. However, Ms. Schoger, unlike Alice, will not
awaken at the end of the story to discover it was all just a dream. Rather, the State asks this
Court to require Ms. Schoger to continue to live in the State's topsy-turvy world for many more
years. This Court should reject the State's arguments for the reasons set forth below

111. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A. Summary Dismissal was Inappropriate Because There was a Genuine

Issue of Material Fact as to Whether Trial Counsel's Ineffective Assistance
Resulted in Preiudice to Ms. Schoger.
Ms. Schoger argued in her opening brief that the District Court should have held an
evidentiary hearing on the question of whether trial counsel's failure to explain the meaning of
constructive possession prejudiced Ms. Schoger. To this the State answers that there was no
genuine issue of material fact because "Schoger never alleged, or presented evidence to make a
pvima facie showing, that she misunderstood the court's questions or that she would have given

different answers to those questions had her attorney explained constructive possession." Brief
of Respondent, pg. 5-6 (emphasis in original). This argument, however, is refuted by the record.
First, the verified pro se post-conviction petition alleged facts raising an issue of material
fact. Ms. Schoger alleged that

I feel that Mr. Bamum had failed to infonn me and guide me through the process
of taking a plea agreement. When the offer was made, Mr. Bamum did not
explain the process or explain the type of questions I would be asked by the Judge.
CR 7. She goes on to allege that Mr. Bamum told the District Court that a plea agreement had
been reached, but did not prepare her for the plea colloquy before Court came back into session.
She also alleged that she did not understand the difference between actual possession and
constructive possession and accordingly told the judge the amount which she actually possessed.
She also alleged that Mr. Bamum did not explain the difference between constructive and actual
possession to her until after the District Court had rejected the plea agreement &d that she
believes that the Court would have accepted her plea had she been properly advised. CR 9.
Second, Paragraph 6 of the Amended Petition alleged that trial counsel was ineffective

because he failed to advise her of the "elements necessary to establish Trafficking in
Methamphetamine by 'constructive possession' or 'dominion and control' as defined under I.C.
37-2732B or applicable Idaho case law. The Petitioner alleges that the lack of effective counsel
lead to confusion and prompted the court to reject her guilty plea, although a factual and legal
basis was tendered." CR 18.
Third, the State in its Answer to Amended Petition denied "the Petitioner was not aware
of the elements necessary to establish Trafficking in Methamphetamine." CR 40. It fkrtller
"[nleither admits or denies the Court rejected the Petitioner's attempted plea as a result of the
confusion alleged to be caused by trial counsel." CR 40. The State's answers to Ms. Schoger's
allegations created a gcnuine issue of matelial fact as to whether Ms. Schoger was confused
about the meaning of the tern1 of art "possession" when she was asked whether she possessed
200 grams of methamphetamine. The State should not be permitted to argue to the contrary on
appeal.

3. Summary Dismissal Was Inappropriate Because the District Court
Abused Its Discretion in Refusing to Accept Ms. Schoger's Guiltv Plea.
The District Court abused its discretion in refusing to accept her proffered guilty plea.
1. The argument that the District Court erred in refusing to accept the
proffered guiltyplea was preserved for appeal.

The state's claim that Ms. Schoger did not preserve her argument that she has a right to
plead guilty is without merit. In the Amended Petition, paragraph 7 alleges that the trial abused
its discretion when it rejected her guilty plea as she "admitted to knowledge that the
meth[amphetamine] was in the house, that such possession was a crime, and that her plea was
free and voluntary." CR 18. This is the argument which is now made on appeal, i.e., once the

requirements of ICR 11 (c)(l)-(5) have been satisfied, the District Court must accept a plea of
guilty. Paragraph 8 alleges the Court erred by refusing to accept the AEford plea by "refus[ing] to
conduct any further inquiry of the factual basis, or to conduct any analysis of whether her plea
was appropriate under [North Carolina]AFord[.ln CR 18. Paragraph 13 also alleges that "the
district court abused its discretion in rejecting her guilty plea on the facts as tendered[.]" CR 19.
Further, at the argument on the state's motion for summary disposition, Ms. Schoger's counsel
argued that the Court should have accepted the plea because "there is a substantial factual basis
that supported her plea." PCP T., pg. 41, In. 4-6. Finally, Ms. Schoger argued that "[iln this
case, Petitioner contends that there was an ample factual basis tendered to the court to establish
control, nexus, possession of a controlled substance. Although the defendant was reluctant to
admit cornplete control over the controlled substances in the house, such control is not required
under Idaho Law. Under these circumstances, Petitioner contends the court exceeded its
discretion in rejecting her plea, and that this issue should have been examined on appeal." Supp.
CP -(Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition lo Summary Disposition, pg. 6-7).
Likewise, on appeal, Ms. Schoger does not contend that the District Courts do not have
discretion to reject a plea which does not conform to ICR 11, but rather contends that when ICR
11 is complied with, as here, the Court is required to accept the plea, even if the Court believes
there may be a defense to the charge. Accordingly, this Court should find the issue was properly
preserved for appeal.
2. The Court did not have discretion to reject the knowing, intelligent and
voluntary plea of Ms. Schoger.

A trial court abuses its discretion if it (1) does not correctly perceive the issue as

discretionary, or (2) does not act within the bounds of discretion or fails to apply the correct legal
standards, or (3) fails to reach the decision through an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Potato

Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761,765,86 P.3d 475,482 (2004)
Thus, it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to reject the plea here because the Court
found that the guilty plea met all the prerequisites for acceptance of a plea listed in ICR 1l(c)(l)(5). Tpg. 102, In. I - pg. I l l In. 9.

THE COURT: Well, Ms. Schoger based upon what you've told me, then, I find
you understand the potential consequences of your decision to plead guilty. I find
that your plead of guilty is a voluntary decision. And finally, that you committed
the crime of trafficking in methamphetamine in a quantity greater than 200 grams.
Do you agree with those finding?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
T pg. 111, In. 10-19. Moreover, defense counsel made a statement to the Court.
Judge, with regard to the methamphetamine that was in the house, primarily Mr.
Davis was the person that was handling that methamphetamine. Ms. Schoger
indicates that he would keep it hidden Erom Ms. Schoger. However, she did
reside in the residence, and we strongly believe that the state is going to he able to
prove constructive possession if this matter does proceed to trial.
And so with respect to the quantity that is within the house, Ms. Schoger admits to
constructively possessing that and would ask the court to proceed forward with
her plea in terms of the 200 grams or more.
T pg. 113, pg.2, In. 22 - pg. 113, in. 5. Of course, the grand jury found there was probable cause
for the charge of Ms. Schoger possessing 400 grams, the State obviously believed there was a
factual basis for the charge and the petit jury later found there was proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Once the Court found all the required factors, the Court did not have the authority to
reject the proffered plea. As the State frankly admits, there is no general requirement that the

trial court must establish a factual basis for the crimes charged prior to accepting a guilty plea.

State v. Colyin, 104 Idaho 543,545,661 P.2d 328,330 (1983); State v. Peterson, 126 Idaho 522,
524,887 P.2d 67,69 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. I-lawkins, 1 1 7 Idaho 285,290,787 P.2d 271,276
(1990). Therefore, in light of Ms. Schoger's right under the Court Rule to enter aplea of guilty,
the District Court did not have the authority to reject the guilty plea for the failure of Ms.
Schoger to provide a sufficient factual basis.
It is no answer to the above to note, as the State does, that "a court must establish a
factual basis when the defendant refuses to admit his participation in the crime or continues to
assert his innocence." Respondent's Brief, pg. 9. The District Court entered into an extended
colloquy with Ms. Schoger, after which it found that the guilty plea met all the prerequisites for
acceptance of a plea listed in ICR 1l(c)(l)-(5). T. Vol. I, pg. 102, in. 1 - pg. 111 in. 9.
THE COURT: Well, Ms. Schoger based upon what you've told me, then, I find
you understand the potential consequences of your decision to plead guilty. I find
that your plead of guilty is a voluntary decision. And finally, that you committed
the crime of trafficking in methamphetamine in a quantity greater than 200 grams.
Do you agree with those finding?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
T. Vol. I, pg. 111, in. 10-19. In light of Ms. Schoger's answers to the Court's questions and the
Court's findings, it did not need to obtain a factual basis for the offense.
While it is true that the "district court may, as part of the plea colloquy, inquire of the
Defendant 'to establish a factual basis for accepting [the guilty plea],' " Respondent's Brief, pg.
9, quoting Stare

IJ.

Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215,217-218,868 P.2d 1231, 1233-34 (1994), it does not

follow that a plea may be rejected if the defendant's statements do not establish a factual basis.
In fact, "[t[he reason for such an inquiry. . . is not to satisfy the court that the defendant is indeed

guilty of the crime. Instead, such an inquiry should serve to indicate that the plea is knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily being entered by the defendant, despite his or her continuing claim
of innocence or inability to recall the facts of the incident." State v. Horkley, 125 Idaho 860,
862-63, 876 P.2d 142, 144-145 (Ct. App. 1994). Even in those cases where a factual basis is
required, it does not need to come from the defendant. "As long as there is a strong factual basis
for the plea, and the defendant understands the charges against him, a voluntary plea of guilty
may be accepted by the court despite a continuing claim by the defendant that he zs innocent."
Sparrow v. State, 102 Idaho 60,61,625 P.2d 414,415 (1981), czting AEford, supra. (emphasis
added). In this case, no factual basis was needed and the Court did not have the discretion to
reject the plea. But even if one were needed, it did not have to come from Ms. Schoger and the
District Court never asked defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney to present a factual basis
before rejecting the plea.
C. Summary Dismissal Was I n a ~ p r o ~ r i aBecause
te
There Were Issues of Disputed
Material Fact as to the Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel Claim.
As shown above, the argument that the District Court should have accepted the guilty
plea is meritorious. Appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue on appeal constituted
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Contray to the State's claim that appellate counsel
was not required to raise a "novel theory," the argument is based upon the plain language of ICR
1l(a) that "[a] defendant may plead guilty or not guilty" and the requirements for the acceptance
of a guilty plea found in subsection (c)(l)-(5). Further, it is well-established law that a court
need not inquire as to the factual basis of a plea in all cases and the defendant is never required to
be the one who provides the factual basis in those cases where one is required. There is nothing

novel about applying the appropriate court rule and well-established case law to the facts of the
case, especially when the District Court's failure to do so resulted in a doubling of the fixed
portion of Ms. Schoger's sentence. Any reasonably competent appellate counsel would have
done so.
IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the above, Ms. Schoger respectfully asks that this Court reverse the district
court's order sumlnarily dismissing her petition for post-conviction relief and remand for further
proceedings.
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